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I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, human rights advocates, legal practitioners,
and academic scholars have criticized roundly both American and foreign
legal systems for their failure to provide sufficient asylum protection to
victims of gender-based persecution. These criticisms have resulted in a
variety of legislative and regulatory efforts in at least a dozen nations to
make asylum available more readily to applicants claiming to have suffered
gender-based persecution. As this Note will discuss in greater detail, most
of these efforts have focused on incorporating gender-based persecution
into the "particular social group" category of the widely-adopted "Refugee
Definition," which appears in the Refugee Convention of 1951.
This Note will argue two main points. Firstly, that, though laudable,
existing-and proposed-efforts to incorporate gender-based persecution
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into the existing definitional framework are innately flawed and that
alternative means are necessary to achieve consistent, straightforward
asylum protection to victims of gender-based persecution.' Secondly, this
Note will propose that the solution to this problem may be an amended
definition of "refugee" that removes the requirement of a causal nexus
between the alleged persecution and one of the five current bases of
asylum: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
2or political opinion. The new definition would only require that
persecution be proven, independent of any required reason for the
persecution.3 Furthermore, this Note will argue that such a definition would
not be overly broad and open up the dreaded "floodgates" of immigration.4
Finally, it should be noted that this Note will consider the international
context of developments in gender-based asylum, but when it speaks of a
"solution," it is ultimately concerned with a solution suitable for
implementation in the United States. It should also be noted that this Note
is mainly concerned with persecution of biological females who live their
lives as women and are persecuted because they are females/women. 5
Therefore, unless stated otherwise, all mentions of "women" and "females"
should be understood to mean biological females who have adopted the
gender role of women.
Part II of this Note will review briefly the development of asylum law
and the definition of refugee, with a focus on Europe and the United States,
up through the enactment of the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the
amendments of the 1967 Protocol. Part III of this Note will discuss why the
traditional framework must be changed to fit the underlying political
purpose of asylum. Part IV then will discuss the international community's
recognition of the need for change and the steps it has taken to provide
greater recognition to gender-based asylum claims. Part V will review the
history of American gender-based asylum law from the enactment of the
1. See infra Part VII.
2. See infra Part VIII.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Females who live as women (in the sense of choosing to be women as opposed to
choosing to abide by all aspects of traditional women's roles in their society) face more
difficulty when applying for asylum because of gender-based persecution than females who
choose to live as men or males who choose to live as women. A transgendered individual,
such as a female choosing the gender role of a man, conceptually falls far more neatly into
the "particular social group" category of asylum than a female living as a woman.
Therefore, because the issues facing transgendered individuals and the issues facing those
who adopt traditional gender roles are different, it should be noted that this Note will focus
on the task of finding a solution for gender-based persecution of females living as women.
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Refugee Act of 1980 to the present day. Part VI will cover notable
developments in gender-based asylum law in various common law and civil
law foreign nations. Part VII will critique the solutions that have been
proposed-some implemented, some not-by various nations and the
scholarly community. Part VIII will propose the elimination of the five
grounds of asylum as a means of better protecting victims of gender-based
persecution and, hence, fulfilling the political purpose of asylum. This Part
will explain that, though the amended statute would not mention gender
explicitly, it would eliminate the difficulties inherent in the current
statute-and certain proposed solutions-that require an applicant for
gender-based asylum to prove her persecutor's intent to persecute her "on
account of' one of the five grounds. This section will discuss the pros and
cons of such a solution, as well as the precise provisions that would need to
be included in the new statutory scheme to make it workable. This Note
then will conclude with a call for further discussion on rethinking our
current asylum law framework.
II. The Development of Asylum Law and the Refugee Definition
The concepts of "asylum" and "refugee" are ancient, global,6 and seem
to have grown and changed throughout history from a very general notion
of a place of safety to a special legal status based on narrow criteria.
Secular and non-secular literature of ancient India, Rome, Greece, and of
the ancient Hebrews demonstrates that these peoples espoused the concept
of asylum several thousand years ago.7 Later, between 500 and 1500 C.E.,
6. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF
PROTECTION 33 (1993) (stating that the concept of asylum has been "in existence for at least
3,500 years and is found, in one form or another, in the texts and traditions of many different
ancient societies").
7. See NAGENDRA SINGH, INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ANCIENT & MEDIEVAL,
VOL. 1, at 48 (1973) (describing that, in ancient India, "[b]oth secular and sacred literature
abound in legends which establish that it was the sacred duty of the king whose shelter any
individual took, to protect the refugee or saranagal at all times"); W. GUNTHER PLAUT,
ASYLUM: A MORAL DILEMMA 11 (1995) (describing Greek, Roman, Hebrew, Egyptian and
Aztec civilizations' recognition of the concept of asylum); Numbers 35:11 ("Then ye shall
appoint you cities to be cities of refuge for you; that the slayer may flee thither, which killeth
any person at unawares."); PLAUT, at 17 (1995) (discussing the frequent appearance of the
command to protect the rights of strangers in the Torah); see also Numbers 35:14 ("Ye shall
give three cities on this side Jordan, and three cities shall ye give in the land of Canaan,
which shall be cities of refuge."); Joshua 20:2 ("Speak to the children of Israel, saying,
Appoint out for you cities of refuge, whereof I spake unto you by the hand of Moses."); I
Chronicles 6:67 ("And they gave unto them, of the cities of refuge, Shechem in mount
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we see the inclusion of the concept of protecting strangers in the text of the
Muslim Qur'an,8 evidence of the notion of "refuge" during the height of the
Aztec civilization,9 and the development of "Church asylum" amongst
followers of the Christian religious tradition.'0
There is also some evidence of the path the ideas of "refugee" and
"asylum" have taken in the history of the word "asylum" itself, which
comes to us from Latin and Greek through Old French and Middle
English." Though we now often think of "asylum" in terms of individuals
seeking safety from political persecution, the ancient languages that handed
the term down to us defined it more generally as a place of protection and
refuge.' 2 Scholars have theorized that the transformation of "refugee" and
"asylum" in the Western World into terms related to the official protection
of foreigners did not arise until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
when the words were used to describe French Huguenots seeking protection
in England. 13 "Azilum," a precursor of today's "asylum," appears to have
been used in the newly-created United States in 1793 by loyalists to the
French Crown who fled a perceived risk of persecution in post-revolution
France and sought refuge in northern Pennsylvania. 4 From this history, it
seems that during the Early Modem Period, the idea of "asylum"
transformed from a concept of general protection to a more narrow remedy
Ephraim with her suburbs; they gave also Gezer with her suburbs.").
8. See Qur'an 5:32 (emphasizing the duty to protect strangers and stating that
"[w]hoever saves a life it is as though he had saved the lives of all human kind").
9. See PLALT, supra note 7, at 11 (describing world civilizations, including the Aztec,
that recognized the concept of asylum).
10. See id. at 19 (citing the CODEX JURIS CANONICI) (giving "[elvery Church. .. the
privilege of being a place of asylum, so that the law breakers who flee thither may not be
surrendered without the agreement of the priest or church authority unless there is overriding
reason to do so"). Church asylum, though still officially recognized by the Roman Catholic
Church, was most widely used from 400-1400 C.E. Id.
11. See ELECTRONIC MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2001), http://quod.lib.umich.
edu/m/med (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (explaining that the Old French term for asylum was
derived from Latin and Greek words referring to a place of sanctuary); see also MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/asylum (last
visited Apr. 13, 2008) (explaining that the Latin term "asylum" was derived from the Greek
term "asylon," meaning an "inviolable place").
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
13. ARISTIDE ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE
CRISES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 5-11 (1989); see also PLAuT, supra note 7, at 40-43
(describing the plight of the Huguenots).
14. ELSIE MURRAY AZILUM: FRENCH REFUGEE VILLAGE OF THE SUSQUEHANNA 1793, 6
n.1 (1940).
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for individuals facing persecution based on mainly religious and political
beliefs.' 5
The twentieth century brought with it a more expansive definition of
"refugee." Before 1938, though refugees were often described according to
nationality or ethnicity, this description was only shorthand for a category
of persons who had been persecuted for traditionally-recognized political or
religious reasons. For example, individuals fleeing the Bolshevik
Revolution in Russia were at odds with their government for political
reasons, but were described as "[a]ny person of Russian origin who does
not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the USSR."'16 There
was no language requiring persecution on account of political opinion
because one's political opinion was assumed based on the national or ethnic
category to which one belonged.
This blanket use of general categories ended in 1938 with the creation
of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) at the conclusion
of the Evian Conference. 17 The ICR's main purpose was to aid Germans
and Austrians in emigrating to other countries, but its mandate did not
require it to aid all German and Austrian individuals. Rather, only
"[p]ersons... who must emigrate on account of their political opinions,
religious beliefs [or] racial origin" were eligible for aid.' 8 After World War
II, the ICR definition was echoed in the constitution of the International
Refugee Organization (IRO), the first refugee aid organization to operate
under the newly-formed United Nations. 19 Among other provisions, the
IRO allowed for individuals to object to repatriation on the basis of
"persecution, or fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because
of race, religion, nationality or political opinions. 20  This language closely
mirrored the definition of refugee that would later appear in the Refugee
15. See PLAUT, supra note 7, at 38-39 (describing importance of politics and religion
in pre-twentieth century Europe and America).
16. Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REv. 733,
806 (1998) (citing Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and
Armenian Refugees, May 12, 1926, 89 L.N.T.S. 47, 49 (1926)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing James C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International
Law: 1920-1950, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348, 370-71 (1984)).
19. See id. at 807 (stating the definition of "refugee" in the constitution of the
International Refugee Organization).
20. Id. (citing Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Annex I, pt. I, §
C(1)(a)(i), 18 U.N.T.S. 283).
REDEFINING THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
Convention of 1951, save for the absence of the "particular social group"
ground.2'
In the years after World War II leading up to the enactment of the
Refugee Convention of 1951, member states of the United Nations were
increasingly concerned by the mass population movements that had been
set into effect by Nazi Germany, and the failure of those movements to
disperse over time. In the summer of 1951, those nations voted to enact the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which
provided a legal model for signatory nations wishing to provide asylum
protection to individuals who faced persecution.22 The Refugee Convention
defined a refugee as someone who
owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
23
Within this definition, one easily recognizes the traditional Early
Modem Period asylum grounds of religious and political persecution,24 as
well as the bases of race and nationality, which appeared in pre-World War
II international texts.25 As mentioned previously, though, most efforts to
bring greater recognition to gender-based persecution claims involve some
interpretation of the one new asylum ground that appears in the Refugee
Convention's definition: membership in a particular social group. 26 Our
21. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1 (A)(2), July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
22. In the original text of the Refugee Convention, Article l(A)(2) also included a
requirement that persecution arise "[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951"
and Article I(B)(1) allowed states to restrict the interpretation of "events" under Article
1 (A)(2) to those events occurring in Europe, if they so desired. Refugee Convention, at art.
1. These temporal and geographic limitations on the refugee definition in the 1951
Convention were founded on a compromise based on some member nations' fear of the
unknown. They were hesitant to "sign a blank check" when they did not know how many
individuals would qualify for asylum. See Steinbock, supra note 16, at 810 n.340. These
restrictions were eliminated, though, by the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 1967. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 1967,
606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
23. Refugee Convention, supra note 21, at art. l(A)(2).
24. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Parts IV-VI.
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search for an understanding of gender-based persecution's place within the
convention framework should, therefore, begin with a look into the history
of the drafting of the refugee definition and, especially, the particular social
group ground.
The refugee definition received great attention during the drafting
period. In 1949, the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems (The Committee), which was charged with considering the
desirability of a Refugee Convention, suggested that the definition of
refugee be based on a "well-founded fear of being a victim of persecution
for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 27  The
Committee chose this definition in preference to broader definitions, such
as France's proposal to define a refugee as one
who seeks asylum or has been granted asylum in any country under the
conditions specified in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; or, who has left his country of origin and refuses to
return thereto owing to a justifiable fear of persecution or because he has
been unable to obtain from that country permission to return.
28
Such broad definitions were not in line with The Committee's
intention that the definition "state unambiguously to whom the convention
would apply. 2 9  The U.S. representative also called for "clearly
enumerated ' 30 categories, so as to avoid later disagreement among member
27. Steinbock, supra note 16, at 809 (citing Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Statelessness and Related Problems II, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess., 1618th mtg. at 12, art.
I(A)(1), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED TRAVAUX PRPARATOIRES OF THE 1951 GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 408 (Alex Takkenberg & Christopher
L. Tahbaz eds., 1989)) [hereinafter COLLECTED TRAVAUX].
28. Id. at 810 (citing France: A Proposal for a Draft Convention, U.N. ESCOR Ad
Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, art. l(l), at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/AC.32/L.3 (1950), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED TRAVAUX, at 148).
29. Id. at 811 (citing Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems II, at 415).
30. Id. at 811 (citing Summary Record of the Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems at 9, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.3 (1950),
reprinted in 1 COLLECTED TRAVAUX, at 165). The U.S. representative also stated:
Since the responsibility of the United Nations would be committed with regard
to refugees placed under its protection under that convention, the extent of that
responsibility must be known in advance, and to that end, it must be known what
categories of refugees would be admitted to that protection. Too vague a
definition, which would amount, so to speak, to a blank check, would not be
sufficient. As the representative of Turkey had rightly pointed out, any unduly
inexact definition would be likely to lead subsequently to disagreement between
the Governments concerned. Furthermore, it was perfectly reasonable for States
signatory to the convention to wish to know precisely to whom it should apply.
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states of the United Nations and to assuage fears that a "blank check" was
being written.31 The "membership in a particular social group" was not
added until the last stage of drafting, when a representative of Sweden
proposed the addition because "[s]uch cases exist[], and it would be as well
to mention them explicitly."3 2 The "particular social group" was, therefore,
a bit of an afterthought, and the precise intentions of the drafters regarding
the contours of this category, if, indeed, they gave it much thought, are not
apparent from the legislative history.
As difficult as it may be to glean intent from the legislative history
regarding "membership in a particular social group," it is even more
difficult to discover how the drafters felt about gender-based persecution.
The only time sex was ever discussed during the drafting of the Convention
occurred when a delegate from Yugoslavia suggested that Article 3, which
mandates that the Convention be applied "without discrimination as to race,
religion or country of origin" be amended to include "sex. ' 33 The drafters
rejected the proposal because "the equality of the sexes was a matter for
national legislation. 3 4  Indeed, UN Reports show that the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and Chairman of the Drafting Conference
understood
the original idea underlying article 3 to be that persons who had been
persecuted on account of their race or religion, for example, should not
be exposed to the same danger in the country of asylum [and that] [h]e
doubted strongjy, whether there would be any cases of persecution on
account of sex.
Therefore, it appears that it never occurred to the drafters that gender
and/or sex could form the basis of an asylum claim.
Id.
31. Id.at8lOn.340.
32. Id. at 812 (citing Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Nineteenth Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess.,
Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/19 (1951) at 13, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED TRAvAuX, at
377).
33. Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status 1 (2000) (citing UN Doc
A/CONF.2/SR.5 at 9).
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.5 at 10).
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III. Why Does It Matter?
Much has changed since 1951, though, and it is important to revisit the
concept of asylum to determine (1) what is the purpose of asylum
protection, and does that purpose include protecting victims of gender-
based persecution, and (2) does our current framework fit that purpose?
This part argues that the purpose of asylum is to provide protection and
membership to individuals who have been persecuted and, consequently,
denied full membership in their home countries, including victims of
gender-based persecution. This part will then argue that the current
framework contains an inherent male bias and, consequently, fails to protect
individuals who have been persecuted because of their gender.
A. Defining the "Point" of Providing Asylum Protection
According to scholar Matthew Price, there are two main ways to think
about asylum: the "humanitarian conception of asylum, 36 and the "political
conception of asylum. 3 7  The humanitarian approach, which has been
adopted by many human rights activists, claims that the purpose of asylum
is to provide protection to people in danger, no matter what the cause of
their distress.38 Under this view "persecution, civil war, famine, extreme
poverty, or some other cause" all create an equal "moral claim for
protection in the form of asylum. 39 The political conception of asylum,
which Price advocates, is based on the idea that asylum has an innately
political purpose, which is to
shelter[] foreigners from specifically political harms-that is, harm
inflicted for illegitimate reasons by state actors or by nonstate actors
with the acquiescence or approval of the state-by interfering with
another state's claim to authority over its citizens; and ... call[] that
state to task by expressing condemnation.
40
36. Matthew Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law's Preference for
Persecuted People, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 413, 418 (2006).
37. Id.
38. See id. (defining the "humanitarian conception of asylum" as the view that "the
Convention refugee definition should be widened to include not only persecuted people, but
also those who need protection from serious harm more generally, regardless of the source
of the harm").
39. Id.at421.
40. Id. at 424.
528
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This political conception finds its footing in the difference between
individuals who only require "protection" and those who require both
"protection" and "membership."'a He posits that asylum should be reserved
for those whose rights have been violated because the state refuses to
recognize and protect those rights or, in other words, for those who have
been denied full membership in their own society.42 This denial of
membership, or "social death" as scholar Mark Drumbl characterizes it,
occurs when, for discriminatory reasons, an individual is "dehumanized" to
the point that her society views her as inferior or an outsider.43 When this
social death occurs, it becomes easy for members of that society to
persecute the dehumanized individual.44 This is to be distinguished from
situations in which an individual's entire society has been placed in danger
due to civil war, natural disaster, famine, etc. In that case, the individual
has only been robbed of a safe environment. In the case of the persecution
victim, the individual has not only been robbed of a safe place to live, but
also membership in her society.45 It is because of this distinction that the
proper remedy for individuals who only need protection is some type of
46temporary protection, whereas persecution victims require both protection
and societal membership, both of which are offered by asylum.47
Though Drumbl explicitly discusses social death in the
context of mass atrocity4 8 and Price mentions it in the context of
41. See id. at 418 ("Asylum is thus just one tool of many in the refugee policy toolkit,
distinguished from the others in that it provides its recipients with a political good:
membership in the state of refuge, and not merely protection of recipients' basic rights.").
42. See id. at 433-34 (employing the scholarship of Rawls and Arendt to discuss the
difference between a situation where an individual's "burdened society recognizes their
entitlement to rights, but is unable to deliver what it acknowledges is owed" as opposed to
having "one's membership repudiated." which is to say that "one's rights go unprotected
because they are unrecognized").
43. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROcITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 41
(2007) ("Once the discrimination takes root, it initially leads to the social deaths of the
victims. Social death means ostracizing and dehumanizing the victim group.").
44. See id. ("It is much easier to kill that which already has been deformed by social
death.").
45. See generally Price, supra note 36 (distinguishing asylum from other forms of aid
to refugees, such as temporary protection, by noting that it "provides its recipients with a
political good: membership in the state of refuge, and not merely protection of recipients'
basic rights").
46. See id. at 431 (describing various aspects of temporary protected status regimes in
the United States and Europe).
47. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
48. See DRUMBL, supra note 43, at 41 ("Victims are the vilified prey stalked by the
perpetrators of mass atrocity.").
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persecution, generally,49 the concept of social death can be
extended to the situation of gender-based persecution. It would
seem, when a person is disdained, regarded as inferior, and then
victimized because of her gender, that social death and a denial of
full societal membership has occurred. Therefore, gender-based
persecution falls within Price's political conception of asylum.
B. The Traditional Framework Unjustly Focuses on an Overtly "Male"
Conception of "Refugee"
Even though victims of gender-based persecution would appear to
qualify for asylum under Price's political conception of asylum, the
Refugee Convention's asylum framework does not provide for the inclusion
of gender-based persecution.5" While there is certainly no evidence that
this was an expression of the drafters' belief that it was acceptable to harm
women, it would seem that such acts were not considered to rise to the level
of persecution. 51 This understanding of the concept of "refugee" was
probably rooted in the drafters' male-centric notion that persecution is
something that only takes place in the public sphere and that acts in the
private sphere, which has traditionally been the domain of women, are
somehow of less concern.52
49. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
50. See generally infra Part II.
51. While the drafters certainly left the equality of the sexes to the national
legislatures, there was certainly no indication that the drafters meant to condone generally
acts of violence against women. See generally infra Part II.
52. See Connie G. Oxford, Protectors and Victims in the Gender Regime of Asylum,
17(3) N.W.S.A.J. 18, 30 (Fall 2005) (citing Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Women's Human
Rights and Cultural Difference, in UMA NARAYAN ET AL., EDS., in DECENTERING THE
CENTER: PHILOSOPHY FOR A MULTICULTURAL, POSTCOLONIAL, & FEMINIST WORLD (2000)).
Oxford describes Okin's arguments:
Susan Moller Okin argues that the fundamental problem with incorporating
women's human rights into an existing human rights framework is that theories,
laws, and ideas of what constitutes human rights follow an androcentric model.
Men's experiences provide the framework for human rights, and the types of
persecution women face are rendered invisible as legitimate cases of harm.
Id. Oxford further states:
The types of persecution that female asylum seekers may
flee... overwhelmingly take place in 'private' institutions such as the family.
As many feminists contend, the harms women face often are erased, deemed
unproblematic, and assumed natural when they occur in a sphere of privacy that
renders such acts invisible.
530
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Feminist theorists have long noted this public/private sphere
dichotomy. " Indeed, it is widely argued that institutions, including legal
institutions, view all matters in terms of gendered dichotomies, such as
public/private, dominant/submissive, rational/emotional, etc., with "male"
corresponding to the first, and more highly-valued, component of each pair,
and "female" corresponding to the second, less-valued component.54 The
history of the development of the refugee definition clearly points to a
male-dominated conception of a "refugee" as one who is persecuted in the
public sphere for acts in the public sphere.55 Indeed, the Chairman of the
Drafting Conference expressed clear doubt as to the existence of sex-based
persecution, and this might have reflected the long-held view of persecution
as a "public" act.
56
Because of cultural realities in many societies, though, the harms
suffered by women often occur in the private sphere.57 Many feminists
have noted that because forms of persecution like domestic violence,
female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and honor killings take place in
the private, familial sphere, such persecution is "erased, deemed
unproblematic, and assumed natural."5 8  Because so many gender-based
persecution claims are brought pursuant to acts that occur within the
private, familial sphere, it has been discounted for decades as "private"
violence that does not fall within the "public" sphere of persecution, and,
therefore, does not constitute a basis for asylum protection. 59 Such a view
is out of touch with evolving international norms,60 and an asylum
Id.
53. See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 379, 382 (1999) (asserting that "international legal discourse" is framed in terms of a long
list of dichotomies).
54. See id. ("Feminist scholars have drawn attention to the gendered coding of these
binary oppositions-the first term signifying 'male' characteristics and the second
'female."').
55. See SPUKERBOER, supra note 33, at 164 (pointing out that refugees are considered
political, which requires existence in the public sphere, whereas "the oppression of women is
seen as occurring in the private sphere," and is, therefore, non-political).
56. Id. ("Private sphere activities which are characteristically women's activities are
denied the quality of 'political."').
57. Id.
58. See Oxford, supra note 52, at 30 (summarizing the views of various feminists).
59. See SPUKERBOER, supra note 33, at 163-65 (summarizing the arguments of the
early feminist critiques of refugee law as viewing the superficially neutral refugee scheme as
an inherently male paradigm that does not view women's private sphere activities as falling
within the refugee definition).
60. See infra Parts IV, VI (discussing efforts by the international community and
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framework built on such assumptions cannot serve nations that recognize
the existence of gender-based persecution.
IV. Developments in Gender-Based Asylum Law in the International
Community
The international community has played a major role in urging
individual states to take steps to protect the rights of women in a variety of
ways, including making reforms to recognize gender-based persecution as a
basis for asylum.
61
A. The European Union
In 1984, the European Parliament led the way by passing a resolution
encouraging states to consider the possibility of defining women who defy
social, religious, or cultural norms as a "particular social group."6' Twenty
years later, in 2004, the European Council took more decisive action in the
form of Directive 2004/83/EC, which delineated asylum law standards.
63
Article 9(2)(f) of the Directive specifically defined "acts of persecution" to
include "acts of a gender-specific ... nature." 64  Article 2(e) of the
Directive also defined the "international protection" states were required to
provide as including some form of temporary "subsidiary protection" that
would provide protection for individuals who, if returned home, "would
face a real risk of suffering serious harm," and do not qualify under other
grounds.65
various countries to integrate gender-based persecution claims into the asylum framework, a
phenomenon that clearly demonstrates a changing attitude toward violence against women).
61. See infra Parts V-VI.
62. Resolution of the European Parliament, O.J. 1984 C127/137.
63. Directive of the European Council, 2004/83/EC (delineating asylum law standards
for Europe).
64. Id. at art. 9(2)(f).
65. Id. at art. 2(e).
REDEFINING THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
B. The United Nations
In 1985, the Executive Committee of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees issued its first Conclusion on Refugee Women
and International Protection that stated, among other things,
[s]tates, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the
interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harm or inhuman
treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the society
in which they live may be considered as a "particular social group"
within the meaning of Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 United Nations• 66
Refugee Convention.
Similar Conclusions would follow in 1993,67 1995,68 1996,69 1997,70
and 1999. 7' The 1985 conclusion was reiterated in 1988 at the UNHCR's
first Consultation on Refugee Women, combined with added
encouragement to nations to develop regulations governing the adjudication
of women's asylum claims to aid in the determination of when a particular
66. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39, 1985.
67. See UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 73, 1993 (recommending the
development of "appropriate guidelines on women asylum-seekers, in recognition of the fact
that women refugees often experience persecution differently from refugee men").
68. See LJNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion, No.77(g), 1995 (calling for
guidelines "including persecution through sexual violence or other gender-related
persecution," but also recommending "monitoring to ensure their fair and consistent
application").
69. See UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion, No. 79(o), 1996 (recalling "its
request that UNHCR support and promote efforts by States towards the development and
implementation of criteria and guidelines on responses to persecution specifically aimed at
women" and calling "on States to adopt an approach that is sensitive to gender-related
concerns and which ensures that women whose claims to refugee status are based upon a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons... including persecution through sexual
violence or other gender-related persecution, are recognized as refugees").
70. See UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion, No. 81(t), 1997 (urging "States,
UNIICR, and other humanitarian organizations. . to take all necessary steps
to ... recogniz[e] as refugees women whose claims to refugee status are based upon a well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol, including persecution through sexual violence or other gender-related
persecution").
71. See UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion, No. 87(n), 1999 (noting "with
appreciation special efforts by States to incorporate gender perspectives into asylum policies,
regulations and practices" and encouraging "States, UNHCR, and other concerned actors to
promote wider acceptance, and inclusion in their protection criteria of the notion that
persecution may be gender-related or effected through sexual violence" through the further
development of "guidelines, codes of conduct, and training programmes on gender-related
refugee issues").
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action by a woman against or in contradiction to her "inferior place" would
be interpreted by her government as resistance to a political system or state-
sponsored religious views.72
In 1991, the UNHCR took an important step by issuing official
"Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women. 7 3  The Guidelines,
though not focused exclusively on gender-based asylum claims, made the
important recognition that "[t]he claim to refugee status by women fearing
harsh or inhumane treatment because of having transgressed their society's
laws or customs regarding the role of women presents difficulties under the
[Refugee Convention] definition. 7 4  This recognition prompted many
countries, including Canada, the United States, and Australia, to examine
their own laws regarding gender-based asylum and to issue domestic
guidelines.75 In 2002, the UNHCR issued revised guidelines with the goal
of giving "legal interpretative guidance for governments. 76  These
guidelines mirrored more closely the gender-based persecution focus of
domestic guidelines, such as Canada's, by discussing how the Convention
definition of refugee should properly be interpreted77 to cover instances of
gender-based persecution, including "acts of sexual violence,
family/domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital
mutilation, punishment for transgression of social mores, and
discrimination against homosexuals. 78
72. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion, No. 54, 1988.
73. UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, 1991.
74. Id. at No. 54. The Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing was also held
in 1995. The Global Platform for Action adopted at that conference expanded the definition
of violence against women and reiterated the state's responsibility to protect women by
calling for the "promot[ion] [of] an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender
perspective in all policies and programmes related to violence against women." Fourth
World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Report of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, 124(g) U.N. Doc A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995). It also "encourag[ed] the
dissemination and implementation of the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women." Id. 128.
75. See infra Parts V-VI.
76. U.N.H.C.R., Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution
within the context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002).
77. See id. 6 ("Even though gender is not specifically referenced in the refugee
definition, it is widely accepted that it can influence, or dictate, the type of persecution or
harm suffered and the reasons for this treatment. The refugee definition, properly
interpreted, therefore covers gender-related claims.").
78. Id. 3.
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International efforts over the past twenty years have consistently
moved toward incorporating gender-based persecution claims under the
"membership in a particular social group" ground, but have stood firmly
behind the Convention refugee definition in its current form and have
rejected the necessity of any change to that definition.79 As discussed
below in Parts V and VI, the approaches of individual nations have often
differed from that of the international community, with some nations
forging a path beyond the stance of the UNHCR to secure a place for
gender-based persecution claims by changing their domestic refugee
definition, while other nations lag behind and have yet to even consistently
rule that instances of gender-based persecution do fall under the Convention
refugee definition. Indeed, one need not look beyond our own borders to
find an example of a nation that has been slow to act.
V. The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law in the United States
The United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol and ratified it in 1968,
but, until 1980, American asylum policy operated on an ad hoc basis that
operated mainly in relation to the country of origin of an asylum applicant,
as opposed to an inquiry into the particular persecution the individual may
have suffered. 0 Passed on March 17, 1980, the Refugee Act brought the
United States into line with international law by amending the Immigration
and Nationality Act and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962
to include a more systematic statutory basis for asylum based on the
Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol.8' Specifically, the
1980 Refugee Act defined a refugee as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
79. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
80. See Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The Forty-Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9, 10-11 (1981) (describing how
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952's strict ethnicity-based quotas and the Attorney
General's parole authority under that Act became "a source of repeated conflict between" the
executive and legislative branches of government).
81. See generally 8 U.S.C. § I 101(A)(42)(A).
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
This language is similar to the UN Refugee Convention in that it
enumerates the same five grounds for asylum-race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion-and
provides protection for those who have a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted" because of these five categories.8 3 It does differ in a few ways,
but these differences are not important for the purposes of this Note.
84
Gender has never officially been codified as a basis for asylum in
United Nations documents or American law, though the possibility of
gender-based asylum has been mentioned in guidelines emanating from
both bodies.85 Certainly, women were never excluded from bringing their
own asylum claims based on one of the five categories, but they have often
had practical difficulties effectively supporting their asylum applications for
a variety of reasons. These reasons include (1) cultural expectations that
women act in a particular manner, often a modest manner that precludes
them from discussing certain kinds of persecution, especially any kind of
sexual abuse and (2) cultural expectations that the husband will "lead" the
asylum claim, if there is a joint application, thereby silencing the woman's
voice during the process.8 6 Therefore, even when a woman has a legitimate
asylum claim that clearly falls under even the narrowest interpretation of
one of the five grounds, gender-related issues can still come into play.
These kinds of difficulties can be alleviated through effective cultural
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The American Refugee Act and the UN Refugee Convention differ in that the
American statute also offers protection for those who have only faced past persecution and
in that persecution must be "on account of' one of the five grounds, instead of "for reasons
of' one of those categories.
85. See supra Part IV.B; see also infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text
(discussing "considerations" American asylum officers should take into account when
adjudicating a female applicant's asylum claim).
86. See Lindsay A. Franke, Not Meeting the Standard: U.S. Asylum Law and Gender-
Related Claims, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 605, 611-12 (2000) (listing cultural obstacles
inherent in the American gender-based asylum claim process, including "difficulty in
describing past sexual abuse to a male interviewer," cultural notions of rape as "a failure on
the part of the woman to preserve her virginity or marital dignity," dilution of testimony
given through male interpreters, and manifestations of psychological trauma, such as
memory loss, passivity, or numbness that may negatively affect credibility); John Linarelli,
Violence Against Women and the Asylum Process, 60 ALB. L. REv. 977, 984 (1997) ("It is
extremely difficult for women to discuss, in the detail necessary to prove their case, some of
the physical, mental and emotional harms inflicted upon them.").
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sensitivity training for asylum officers and administrative law judges. The
Department of Homeland Security has undertaken efforts to minimize the
negative effect of cultural misunderstandings on asylum adjudications
through the development of training manuals and programs aimed at
educating their adjudicators about cultural sensitivity.87
The problem becomes far more serious, though, when a woman's
entire asylum claim hinges on gender-based persecution, as "gender" is not
one of the five explicit grounds for asylum. Indeed, even when an instance
of gender-based persecution might fall under one of the five grounds, the
private nature of so many types of gender-based persecution can make it
difficult to prove the persecutor's intent.88 Even though the international
community has recognized that gender-based persecution can form a basis
for asylum, the mechanisms these various nations have developed to
incorporate gender into the "particular social group" category have often
been unsatisfactory.89
Looking first to the United States, the path toward recognition of
gender-based asylum arguably began in 1985 with the landmark case of In
re Acosta,9" which held that a "particular social group" may include
87. See generally AOBTC BASIC TRAINING MATERIALS, INTERVIEWING PART IV:
INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY IMPEDE
COMMUNICATION AT AN ASYLUM INTERVIEW; FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-
RELATED CLAIMS AND ASYLUM MANUAL, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/
nativedocuments/AffrmAsyMan FNL.pdf.
88. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
89. See infra Part VII.
90. See 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 237 (1985) (holding that respondent has not shown he is
eligible either for asylum or witholding of deportation to El Salvador). In Acosta, the United
States Department of Justice Board of Immigration Appeals considered whether the
respondent met his burden of proof for relief from deportation through asylum or mandatory
withholding of deportation. Id. at 213. The respondent was a 36-year-old male native and
citizen of El Salvador. Id. at 213. In a deportation hearing held before an immigration judge
in 1983, the respondent conceded his deportability for entering the United States without
inspection and accordingly was found deportable as charged. Id. at 213. The immigration
judge denied the respondent's applications for a grant of asylum and for mandatory
witholding of deportation to El Salvador, and respondent appealed. The Court established
the evidentiary burdens for the respondent to be eligible for witholding of deportation and
for asylum. Id. at 213. The Court stated that in order to be eligible for witholding of
deportation to any country, an alien must show that his "life or freedom would be threatened
in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." Id. at 213. The Court also stated that in order to be eligible for
a grant of asylum, an alien must show he or she is a "refugee" as defined in section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, § U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). After establishing both evidentiary
burdens, the Court concluded that the respondent failed to meet the necessary burden for
witholding of deportation because the respondent had not demonstrated a sufficient
likelihood of persecution at the hands of either the government or the guerrillas to make his
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individuals with shared, immutable characteristics, including sex.9' The
Board also held, though, that a case-by-case determination would be needed
to determine what characteristic could be applied to the "particular social
group" category.92  In the course of the next ten years, courts split on
whether gender alone could constitute membership in a particular social
group.93  Even those courts that found that gender alone constituted
membership in a particular social group never actually granted asylum on
that basis, as the factual assertion that persecution was based solely on the
applicant's gender could never be satisfactorily proven.
94
fear "well-founded." Id. at 236. The Court also concluded that the respondent failed to meet
the necessary burden for an asylum claim because he failed to show that (1) his present fear
of persecution by the government and the guerrillas was "well-founded;" (2) the persecution
he feared was on account of one of the five grounds specified in the Act; and (3) he was
unable to return to the country of El Salvador, as opposed to a particular place in that
country, because of persecution. Id. at 236.
91. See id. at 233. The Board wrote:
[W]e interpret the phrase 'persecution on account of membership in a particular
social group' to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership."
Id.
92. See id. at 233 ("The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under
this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.").
93. See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Possession of
broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals
with membership in a particular group."); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)
("[T]o the extent that the petitioner in this case suggests that she would be persecuted or has
a well-founded fear that she would be persecuted in Iran simply because she is a woman, she
has satisfied the first of the three elements that we have noted.").
94. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240. The Court stated:
[T]o the extent that the petitioner in this case suggests that she would be
persecuted or has a well-founded fear that she would be persecuted in Iran
simply because she is a woman, she has satisfied the first of the three elements
that we have noted. She has not, however, satisfied the third element; that is, she
has not shown that she would suffer or that she has a well-founded fear of
suffering 'persecution' based solely on her gender.
Id.; see Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Dept. of
Justice to All INS Asylum Officers RE Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating
Asylum Claims for Women 13 (May 26, 1995). Coven writes:
[W]hile some courts have concluded as a legal matter that gender can define a
particular social group, no court has concluded as a factual matter that an
applicant has demonstrated that the government (or a persecutor the government
could not or would not control) would seek to harm her solely on account of her
gender."
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In 1995, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a memo
containing "Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum
Claims for Women." 95 The "Considerations" outlined the state of gender-
based asylum law in the United States and in international law, but did not
allow for asylum protection solely for gender-based persecution. 96 Also,
unlike the Canadian guidelines that will be discussed in Part VI, the
American "Considerations" truly are just considerations. They are not
succinct rules or guidelines that instruct judges how to rule in certain types
of cases. Rather, they simply lay out domestic and international sources of
law and guidance on the issue and leave it to the judge to decide. This is
not inherently a bad idea, but, as discussed a bit later in this section, such an
approach has led to frustrating inconsistencies in the adjudication of
gender-based asylum claims.
Next came In re Kasinga97 in 1996, in which the Board held that
female genital mutilation (FGM) can form the basis of an asylum claim and
explicitly recognized gender as part of the determination of one's
membership in a "particular social group." Gender, however, was only part
of that determination, which also included the characteristics of (1) not
having been mutilated, (2) being a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
of northern Togo, and (3) opposing the practice of FGM.98 Therefore,
though In re Kasinga recognized gender as a partial ground for asylum, it
was a narrow holding. 99
Id.
95. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, supra note 94.
96. See id. at 13-15 (discussing the theoretical possibility that gender might form the
basis of a "particular social group," but stating that no court has ever found that an individual
was persecuted "solely on account of her gender").
97. See 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (1996) (holding that female genital mutilation can be the
basis for a claim of persecution). The United States Department of Justice, Board of
Immigration Appeals, reviewed the issue of whether female genital mutilation can be the
basis for a grant of asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (1994). Id. at 358. A 19-year-old citizen of Togo submitted an application
for asylum based on fear of being subjected to female genital mutilation, as was the custom
of the tribe to which she belonged. Id. at 358. The subjective intent to harm was rejected as
a requirement for implicating persecution and it was held that female genital mutilation was
consistent with "persecution" under the statute. Id. at 368.
98. See id. at 357 ("Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by
that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a 'particular social
group.').
99. For other narrow applications, see Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding a Mexican girl "subjected to extreme abuse by her father" was
persecuted on account of membership in a particular social group); Hernandez-Montiel v.
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One of the most difficult areas of gender-based asylum concerns how
victims of domestic violence should be treated. The case of In re R-A - 100
made clear just how difficult this issue could be. Asylum applicant Rodi
Alvarado was a Guatemalan woman who sought asylum from her abusive
husband.'0 ' The Guatemalan government had refused to protect her from
the beatings and rapes she was regularly subjected to, and so she fled to the
United States, fearing for her life.'02 In 1996, the Immigration Judge
initially granted her asylum under the "particular social group" category, as
a "Guatemalan wom[a]n who ha[d] been involved intimately with [a]
Guatemalan male companion[.. .], who believe[d] that women are to live
under male domination."'1 3 Three years later the Bureau of Immigration
Appeals reversed the Immigration Judge's decision because it did not
believe Ms. Alvarado had been persecuted "on account" of her membership
in any "particular social group."' 4  Rather, the BIA found that Ms.
Alvarado had been persecuted because she was her persecutor's wife and
not for any of the five reasons enumerated under the Refugee Act.
10 5
Therefore, her asylum application was denied, and she was ordered to
voluntarily depart or be deported. 10 6  The case had received extensive
national coverage, though, and many people were very unhappy with the
outcome. 0 7 At the end of her time as U.S. Attorney General, Janet Reno
INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (focusing on the widespread abuse of homosexuals, as
opposed to gender-based abuse).
100. See 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (1999), vacated by Attorney General Reno (2001).
101. See id. at 908 (describing Alvarado's abusive marriage).
102. See id. at 909 (describing Alvarado's futile attempts to gain police help in
Guatemala and her subsequent flight to the United States).
103. Id. at 911.
104. See id. at 920 ("On the record before us, we find that the respondent has not
adequately established that we should recognize, under our law, the particular social group
identified by the Immigration Judge.").
105. The Board stated:
We further find that her husband's motivation, to the extent it can be
ascertained, has varied; some abuse occurred because of his warped perception
of and reaction to her behavior, while some likely arose out of psychological
disorder, pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all.... We are not persuaded
that the abuse occurred because of her membership in a particular social group
or because of an actual or imputed political opinion.
Id. at 927.
106. ld. at 928.
107. See generally Fredric N. Tulsky, Abused Woman is Denied Asylum: Immigration
Ruling Reflects Split Over Gender Persecution, WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, at Al; Women
Seeking Asylum in US for Domestic Abuse Find It More Difficult To Be Approved by INS,
540
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vacated the removal order and proposed regulations that would officially
state that gender can form the basis of a "particular social group." '
Unfortunately, it has been nine years since these regulations were
proposed, and official approval does not seem forthcoming. Efforts by the
press to penetrate the process and discover what is going on at the
Department of Homeland Security have only resulted in assurances that the
Department is "working diligently" on the regulations.109 While DHS is
taking its time, both asylum applicants and immigration judges are
suffering. Without clear guidance, immigration judges have been issuing
inconsistent decisions in gender-based asylum claims that have ranged from
grants to denials to continuances until the regulations are approved."0
Immigration judges are aware of the problem and, in 2007, immigration
judges met with then-Attorney General Gonzales to ask, again, for clear
regulations regarding gender-based asylum claims."' Two years later, they
are still waiting, and the status of gender-based asylum law in the United
States is uncertain at best.
VI. Developments in Foreign Nations
Other countries have approached gender-based persecution asylum
claims differently, and often more effectively, than the United States.
Though there are some similarities in approach among some of the
countries surveyed below, there generally appears to be disagreement as to
the best way to approach gender-based asylum cases. This Part will review
the laws of several common law and civil law nations, and the next Part
will critique the various methods with an eye to the suitability of such
schemes in the United States.
NPR, MORNING EDMON, July 8, 1999.
108. Asylum & Withholding Regulations, 65 Fed Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R pt. 208).
109. See generally Alex Kotlowitz, Asylum for the World's Battered Women, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007 (Magazine).
110. See id. at 3-4 ("Immigration judges have interpreted this logjam in conflicting
ways. There have been grants as well as denials of asylum for domestic-violence victims,
and there have been many cases that.., have been placed in limbo until there's some clarity
about our policy."). See generally Ming H. Chen, Explaining Disparities in Asylum Claims,
12 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 29 (2006-2007); Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with
Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295 (2007).
111. See Kotlowitz, supra note 109, at 2 ("At a recent gathering with Attorney General
Gonzales, immigration judges reiterated their longstanding request for clear regulations so
that they'd have some guidance.").
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A. Common Law Nations
1. Canada: Guidelines and "Innate Characteristic" Test
Canada has been a major leader among common law nations in
providing for greater recognition of gender-based persecution asylum
claims. In 1993, Canada became the first State Party to the Refugee
Convention to issue guidelines for adjudicating gender-based asylum
applications.' 12 The current Canadian guidelines specifically provide for
protection of
[w]omen who fear persecution resulting from certain
circumstances of severe discrimination on grounds of gender or
acts of violence... (i.e. domestic violence and situations of civil
war) ... [or] as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for
transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or
customary laws and practices in their country of origin. (i.e.
arranged marriage, wearing of make-up, visibility or length of
hair, or type of clothing a woman chooses to wear)." 13
The same year, in Ward v. Canada,1 4 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that gender could form the basis of a "particular social group" category
because gender is a group "defined by an innate or unchangeable
characteristic.""' 5  Therefore, though Canada has shied away from any
statutory changes, its guidelines and Supreme Court opinions have made
positive steps toward recognition of gender-based persecution claims.
2. United Kingdom: Guidelines and "Immutable Characteristic" Test
British courts took a similar view to that of the Canadian Supreme
Court in the case of Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department."16
112. CAN. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD., WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING
GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (Guidelines issued by the Chairperson of the Board in
accordance with subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act) (1993).
113. CAN. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD., WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING
GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION: UPDATE (Updated version of the Guidelines issued by the
Chairperson of the Board in accordance with subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act) 2
(2003) [hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES].
114. See 2 S.C.R. 689 (1993) (providing background on Canada's approach to gender-
based persecution claims).
115. Id. 78.
116. 2 A.C. 629 (1999). Islam concerned two Pakistani women who had "suffered
violence in their country of origin after their husbands had falsely accused them of adultery"
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This case also held that gender could form part of the "particular social
group." ' 7 The Law Lords were divided, though, over whether the relevant
"particular social group" should be characterized as "Pakistani Women" or
"Pakistani Women Accused of Adultery."'"18  Therefore, it is somewhat
unclear from the holding whether gender alone can constitute a particular
social group or whether gender must be combined with some other element
to form a particular social group. Because there was no consensus, the
value of the opinion is similar to that of the American case In re Kasinga,
discussed above, which also held that gender could form part of a
"particular social group."
In 2000, the United Kingdom's Immigration Appellate Authority
followed Canada's lead and issued guidelines describing when gender-
based acts of persecution constitute grounds for asylum under one of the
five Refugee Convention bases." 9 The guidelines were updated in 2006.120
Both versions contained the "immutable characteristic" language of Islam in
their definitions of "membership in a particular social group."
12 1
and had applied for asylum in the U.K. for fear of receiving physical and emotional abuse if
they returned. Id. at 629. The Home Office denied the applicants "on the ground that the
applicants were not members of a 'particular social group' within the meaning of article
1A(2) of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees." Id. at 630. The
court held that a "particular social group" "had to exist independently of the persecution so
that persecution alone could not be relied on to prove the group's existence, but that
cohesiveness was not an essential requirement." Id. Further, "because in Pakistan women
were discriminated against as a group in matters of fundamental human rights, and the state
gave them no protection.., women in Pakistan constituted a 'particular social group' which
was more narrowly defined by unifying characteristics of gender, of being suspected of
adultery and of lacking protection from the state and public authorities." Id. Thus, "the
applicants' well founded fear of persecution which was sanctioned or tolerated by the state
was for reasons of membership of a particular social group; and that, accordingly, they were
entitled to asylum under the Convention." Id.
117. Id. at629.
118. Id.
119. NATHALtA BERKOwITZ & CATRIONA JARVIS, IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTHORITY,
ASYLUM GENDER GUIDELINES (2005), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/
legal/gender guidelines/UK guidelines.pdf
120. U.K. BORDER AG., GENDER ISSUES IN THE ASYLUM CLAIM (2006), available at
http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylum
policyinstructions/apis/genderissueintheasylum.pdf.
12 1. In its Report, the U.K. Boarder Agency sets out its reasoning:
In Shah and Islam it was found that women in Pakistan constituted a particular
social group. This was because women shared the same immutable characteristic
of gender, they formed a distinct group in society as evidenced by widespread
discrimination in their fundamental rights and the state did not give them
adequate protection as they were not seen as entitled to the same human rights as
men.
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3. Australia: Vague Guidelines
In 1996, Australia issued guidelines discussing gender-based
persecution.1 22 These guidelines recognized that there was no Australian
precedent on the issue of "women" as a particular social group, under the
Refugee Convention, but did not preclude the possibility. 123 Indeed, the
guidelines went so far as to mention that the Refugee Review Tribunal had
found that women had both immutable characteristics and shared common
social characteristics that might make them eligible for status as a particular
social group.
In 2002, in an opinion that did not cite the guidelines, an Australian
court found that a Pakistani woman who sought asylum from her abusive
husband could qualify as a refugee. 124  Unfortunately, soon after this
opinion was issued, the Australian legislature chose to narrow the causal
connection aspect of refugee law.1
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4. New Zealand. "Protected Characteristic" Test
The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA)
generally follows the Canadian Ward "protected characteristic" test and has
used it to grant asylum based on gender and sexual orientation. For
example, in 2000, a New Zealand court granted asylum to an Iranian
woman who had been physically and emotionally abused by her ex-husband
and who was granted no protection by state authorities. 26 The court found
Id. at 9; supra note 119, at 41 ("Shared immutable characteristics: .... Particular social
groups can be identified by reference to innate or unchangeable characteristics or
characteristics that a woman should not be expected to change.").
122. See Aus. DEPT. OF IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, REFUGEE AND
HUMANITARIAN VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION-MAKERS
1.2 (1996) ("In recognising that women may experience persecution differently from men,
the guidelines provide advice on how decisionmakers can best approach claims of gender-
based persecution.").
123. See id. 2.15 ("It should be noted that these guidelines do not advocate gender as
an additional ground in the Refugee Convention.").
124. Ministry for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar,76 A.L.R.J. 667
(2002).
125. See Catherine Hunter, Khawar & Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6):
Why Narrowing the Definition of a Refugee Discriminates Against Gender-Related Claims,
8 Aus. J. OF HUMAN RTS. 1 (2002) (describing the effects of Bill No. 6 on gender-based
claims).
126. See Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, N.Z.A.R. 545, 15-35 (1999) (describing the
physical beatings, infidelity, and emotional abuse-including the selling of her child-
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that the applicant was being persecuted because of her gender and that her
gender qualified as a "particular social group" under the convention
grounds.
127
5. South Africa & Ireland: Amendment of the Statutory Definition of
"Refugee"
Both South Africa and Ireland have taken a more direct approach to
incorporation of gender into the "member of a particular social group"
category. Ireland's Refugee Act of 1996 states that "'membership of a
particular social group' includes membership of a trade union and also
includes membership of a group of persons whose defining characteristic is
their belonging to the female or the male sex or having a particular sexual
orientation. 1 28  South Africa took a similar approach by defining
"membership in a particular social group" to include "among others, a
group of persons of particular gender, sexual orientation, disability, class or
caste."29
B. Civil Law Nations
1. Germany, Sweden, & Spain: Amendment of the Statutory Definition of
"Refugee"
Like Ireland and South Africa, Germany, Sweden, and Spain have all
recently amended their refugee statutes to include gender-based persecution
in the definition of "refugee."
Germany's 2005 Immigration Act codified the definition of "particular
social group" to include persecution "solely on account of sex.' 30 The next
year, Sweden enacted a new Aliens Act that also specifically included
endured by appellant).
127. See id. 106 ("As can be seen from these principles it is indisputable that gender
can be the defining characteristic of a social group and that 'women' may be a particular
social group.")
128. Irish Refugee Act, 1996 (Act No. 17/1996) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatute book. ie/1 996/en/act/pub/001 7/secOOO .html.
129. South Africa Refugees Act 130 of 1998 art. 1.xxxi.
130. Zuwanderungsgesetz [Immigration Act] Jan. 1, 2005, § 60(1) ("Eine Verfolgung
wegen der Zugeh6rigkeit zu einer bestimmten sozialen Gruppe kann auch dann vorliegen,
wenn die Bedrohung des Lebens, der k6rperlichen Universehrtheit oder der Freiheit allein an
das Geschlecht anknilpft.").
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gender and sexual orientation as particular social groups within the
definition of a "refugee":
In this Act "refugee" means an alien who is outside the country of the
alien's nationality, because he or she feels a well-founded fear of
persecution on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political belief,
or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a
particular social group and is unable, or because of his or her fear is
unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.131
Following suit, in 2007 Spain enacted the Amendment to the Organic
Law for the Effective Equality of Women and Men,1 32 which included an
amendment to the asylum law that declared that refugee protection "applies
to foreign women who have fled their countries on account of a well-
founded fear of suffering gender-based persecution."'
133
2. The Netherlands & Norway: Silent Legislation Supplemented by
Gender-Based Persecution Guidelines
Neither Dutch nor Norwegian legislation include any mention of
gender-based persecution. 134  Both nations have adopted some form of
guideline to deal with gender-based persecution issues. In the Netherlands,
the implementation guidelines for the Dutch Aliens Act advocate a "gender-
inclusive approach to asylum."'135  Furthermore, it has been the official
policy of the Dutch government, in the form of the Dutch Refugee Council,
that
persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group, may
also be taken to include persecution because of social position on the
basis of sex. This may be especially true in situations where
discrimination against women in society, contrary to the rulings of
international law, has been institutionalized and where women who
131. 4 ch. 1 § Aliens Act (SFS 2006:220).
132. Ley Orgdnica Para la Igualdad Efectiva de Mujeres y Hombres (B.O.E. 1984, 74).
133. Id. ("[S]eri de aplicaci6n a las mujeres extranjeras que huyan de sus paises de
origen debido a un temor fundado a sufrir persecuci6n por motivos de ginero.").
134. See SPUKERBOER, supra note 33, at Annex 7 (citing Dutch legislation); 3 ch. §§
15-22 Norwegian Immigration Act (2002) (failing to make any mention of gender-based
persecution in its laws concerning refugees).
135. General Assembly WOMI1601/Rev.1* Committee on Elimination of
Discrimination against Women Chamber B, 767th & 768th Meetings (AM & PM) (Jan. 24,
2007) (discussing provisions of the Vreemdelingencirculaire [Aliens Act Implementation
Guidelines]).
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oppose this discrimination, or distance themselves from it, are faced
with drastic sanctions, either from the authorities themselves, or from
their social environment, where the authorities are unwilling or unable
to offer protection.136
This policy is somewhat more limited than the Canadian guidelines,
which highlight many situations in which gender can be the basis for
persecution, as opposed to the single situation involving inferior social
position mentioned in the Dutch directive.
Similarly, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice has issued guidelines for
gender-based asylum applications that specify that when women are
persecuted for transgressing social rules, such persecution falls under the
Refugee Convention. 137 It is also expected that guidelines for a new draft of
the Aliens Act will contain an expanded view of gender-based
persecution.1
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3. Switzerland- Some Statutory Recognition of Gender-Based Persecution,
But No Recognition of Persecution by Non-State Actors
The Swiss courts still do not recognize actions by non-state actors as
persecution under the refugee definition. 139 Because of this, most gender-
based asylum applications are thrown out before the 1998 Swiss Asylum
Law can be applied, resulting in very little case law in this area.140 The
1998 Law does provide for consideration of "motives for flight specific to
136. SPIJKERBOER, supra note 33, at Annex 7.
137. See HEAVEN CRAWLEY & TRINE LESTER, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER-
RELATED PERSECUTION IN NATIONAL ASYLUM LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE 26
(UNHCR 2004) ("In Norway, the 1998 Ministry of Justice guidelines introduced recognition
of non-State agents, and the possibility of gender constituting a Convention ground for the
granting of refugee status. They also introduced the principle of giving asylum applicants the
benefit of the doubt.").
138. Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR Welcomes Norwegian Steps to Strengthen
Refugee Protection (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.se/en/News/press07/press_
070209.html.
139. See CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, GENDER GUIDELINES: SWITZERLAND,
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/law/genderguidelines.php#Switzerland (last visited Feb. 14,
2009) ("[A]s the European Council on Refugees and Exiles has observed, 'this provision has
resulted in very limited case-law, as most gender related applications are rejected in
accordance with current Swiss practice on this issue, on the grounds that persecution is not
perpetrated by state or quasi state agents."') (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
140. Id.
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women." 141  At this point, Switzerland has not issued any guidelines
defining or discussing what these "motives" might be. It should be noted,
though, that Swiss courts have granted asylum to women for what was
arguably gender-based persecution.
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VII. Critique of Solutions
The previous section discussed many current approaches to the
gender-based asylum issue, all of which are grounded either in the addition
of gender as a sixth ground for asylum or in an expansive definition of the
"particular social group" category of the Refugee Convention, either
through judicial opinions, guidelines, and/or legislation. 143  Indeed,
advocates of the latter approach are essentially requesting that gender itself
be considered a "particular social group."' 44 Though such a conception may
derive some legitimacy from the fact that gender is a social construct,
gender-based persecution usually deals with individuals whose biological
sex and gender role are either both feminine or both masculine.' 4  An
individual who had chosen a gender role distinct from his or her biological
sex would clearly be part of a "particular" social group. However, defining
a group of people who comprise about half of society (females who live as
women) as a "particular social group" would seem to defy the addition of
the modifier "particular."
Clearly, though, human rights advocates have fought to include
gender-based persecution claims under the "particular social group" ground
for practical reasons; it is simply the best way to shoe-horn asylum
protection for victims of gender-based persecution into a framework that
never considered gender. 46 The particular social group method has also
been the most successful approach up until now and is to be applauded for
141. Loi sur L'Asile [Asylum Law] Jun. 26, 1998, RS 142.31, art. 3(2) (Switz.) ("I1 y a
lieu de tenir compte des motifs de fuite sprcifiques aux femmes.").
142. See Schweizerische Asylrekurskommission (ARK Zollikofen), EMARK 2006 Nr.
32 available at (granting asylum application of Ethiopian woman claiming inadequate state
protection from marital kidnapping-when kidnapper enjoyed national power and
influence-and noting that this was a type of persecution inherently tied to gender),
available at http://edvgt.jura.uni-sb.de/www.iarlj.org/dboutput.php?id=233&download=1.
143. See supra Part VI.
144. Id.
145. See supra note 5 (discussing the different matter of transgendered individuals in
gender-based asylum issues).
146. See supra Part II.
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its creativity and effect. 147 When one critically examines the situations of
individuals seeking asylum from gender-based persecution, though, it
becomes apparent that including gender-based persecution in the "particular
social group" category is simply illogical. Though this approach has had
some success, 148 the incongruity of the fit between gender-based
persecution and the "particular social group" ground has caused serious
jurisprudential problems in the United States and abroad that have limited
the capacity of this method to provide asylum protection to all victims of
gender-based persecution. 149 To illustrate this "misfit," this subsection will
look at the use of the "particular social group" approach in three common
categories of gender-based persecution: threatened honor killings, female
genital mutilation, and domestic violence.
In the hypothetical case of a threatened honor killing of a woman who
has been raped, an American administrative law judge could fairly easily
construct a "particular social group" comprised of "women who have been
raped" out of the applicant's situation, thereby contorting the refugee statute
to produce the desired result. The refugee statute did not contemplate
gender-based violence when it was enacted, though, and it was clearly not
thinking of "women who have been raped" when it included the "particular
social group" category. 150 Indeed, we have very little information regarding
the drafters' understanding of the "particular social group" category. 15'
Furthermore, the real reason this individual is being persecuted is because
she is a woman. But for her sex, she would not have faced the threat of an
honor killing, 152 and it is a stretch, at best, to maintain that her persecution
is based on membership in a "particular social group."'
153
147. See supra Part VI.
148. See id. (discussing statutes, cases, and guidelines in foreign countries that have had
some success in securing asylum for women based on gender-based persecution claims).
149. See supra Parts V-VI.
150. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
152. See generally U.S. STATE DEPT., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: PAKISTAN (2007).
153. This subsection is only concerned with demonstrating the incongruity of the
"particular social group" category and gender-based asylum claims. This Note will later
discuss the aptness of different solutions to accommodate gender-based claims, even if they
do rely on the "particular social group." For example, the Note will discuss how even
statutory definitions of a "particular social group" as including gender are insufficient, as the
causal nexus (i.e. "on account of' language) is especially difficult to prove in gender-based
persecution cases.
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Female genital mutilation (FGM) cases pose an even greater logical
difficulty for the "particular social group." Courts often try, with success,
to shoe-horn asylum applicants fearing female genital mutilation into the
"particular social group" of "women who oppose female genital
mutilation."'15 4 Though we are to applaud these courts' efforts to protect
women from deportation to a country where they will be subject to FGM,
this is still a false characterization of the situation. Asylum applicants from
regions where FGM is widespread are not targeted because they oppose
mutilation. 5 5 Rather, they are targeted simply because they are women.
Their political opinions and social affiliations do not matter. In such
societies, all women must be mutilated because they are women. 5 6 Under
the current framework, immigration judges have managed to concoct
theories that allow women to avoid FGM under the "particular social
group" theory, but it is an incongruous fit. Consistency and good
jurisprudence would be served far better by a legal mechanism that would
allow for the official granting of asylum based on proof of persecution,
regardless of the ground. It would be an honest statement of what many
administrative law judges are already doing. 1
5 7
Finally, the situation becomes far more complex when dealing with the
intersection of asylum law and domestic violence. As discussed above, in
the case of Rodi Alvarado, the Guatemalan woman fleeing severe domestic
abuse, the immigration judge attempted to create a "particular social group"
for Ms. Alvarado, namely, "Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with [a] Guatemalan male companion[.. .], who believes that
154. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (1996) ("In the context of this
case, we find the particular social group to be the following: young women of the Tchamba-
Kunsunto Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the
practice.").
155. See generally U.N.I.C.E.F., FEMALE GENITAL MUriLATION/CuTrING (2005),
available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/FGM-Cfinal 10 October.pdf (dis-
cussing various socio-economic variables affecting the rates of FGM in countries with high
levels of practitioners).
156. The U.N.I.C.E.F Report states:
Female circumcision is practiced by people of many ethnicities and various
religious backgrounds, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews, as well as
followers of traditional African religions. For some it is a rite of passage. For
others it is not. Some consider it aesthetically pleasing. For others, it is mostly
related to morality or sexuality.
Id. at 17.
157. See, e.g., In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (1999), vacated by Attorney General
Janet Reno (2001) (describing the ALJ's attempt in Rodi Alvarado's case to fashion a
"particular social group" that would allow her to obtain asylum).
REDEFINING THE REFUGEE DEFINITION
women are to live under male domination."'158  Unfortunately for Ms.
Alvarado, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals was unwilling to go along
with the immigration judge and ruled that Ms. Alvarado was not being
persecuted on account of membership in a particular social group, but,
rather, because she was her persecutor's wife. 59 Immigration judges
continue to struggle with the tension between the desire to do what appears
to be the just thing-i.e. to protect individuals like Ms. Alvarado-and
what appears to be provided for by law-i.e. asylum is only available to
individuals persecuted on account of one of the five grounds. The logical
difficulty in incorporating gender-based persecution in the "particular social
group" category may explain why it is taking the United States so long to
approve Attorney General Janet Reno's regulations. With this tension in
mind, let us now turn to an analysis of current and proposed solutions to the
gender-based asylum problem.
A. European-Style Subsidiary Protection
The subsidiary protection provisions required by the European
Council 160 may at first seem like an attractive alternative to an unwieldy
refugee definition that has failed to address the needs of victims of gender-
based persecution.16 1 There are, however, two major problems with
subsidiary protection models that render them inappropriate for women
seeking asylum from gender-based persecution. Firstly, subsidiary
protection remedies ignore the political purpose behind asylum, namely, to
condemn the actions of another state by providing membership to
persecuted individuals who have, by virtue of their persecution, been denied
full membership in their own society. Because of the fundamentally
temporary nature of subsidiary protection, it does not provide the full
membership in a new society that asylees should be afforded.
62
158. Id. at911.
159. See id. at 917 ("[T]he myriad situations in which the abuse occurred and the
various unsuccessful responses adopted by the respondent point strongly away from it
having a genesis in her husband's perception of the respondent's political opinion.").
160. See Directive of the European Council, supra note 63, at art. 2(e), ch. V-VI
(defining "subsidiary protection" and the requirements for obtaining it).
161. Id.
162. See id. at art. 16(1) ("A third country national or a stateless person shall cease to be
eligible for subsidiary protection when the circumstances which led to the granting of
subsidiary protection status have ceased to exist or have changed to such a degree that
protection is no longer required.").
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Secondly, there are serious practical difficulties with the application of
subsidiary protection as a remedy for the plight of a persecuted woman.
Because refugee status carries with it many important rights that often do
not accompany subsidiary protection status163 and because subsidiary
protection is conceptually temporary, though it can be renewed and endure
an entire lifetime, it has the potential to create an underclass of asylum
seekers who are stuck in a sort of social and legal limbo.' 64 Generally,
subsidiary protection is temporary in nature and will be revoked once the
host country determines it is safe for the immigrant to return to her home
country. 165 This may be an effective approach in times of civil war or
political unrest, which are likely to end in a matter of months or years.
166
Gender-based persecution is unlikely to be solved within a lifetime, though,
as it takes so long for societal attitudes to change. Therefore, it is possible
that subsidiary protection would lead to the development of a group of
individuals who would never actually return to their home country, but who
are prevented from fully investing in their new home because of the
artificial wall of "temporary" immigrant status. 67 This is already the de
facto situation for many women asylum-seekers in the United States whose
cases are pending approval of the proposed regulations. 168  This is
obviously not a desirable situation for the immigrant, nor is it desirable for
the host country, which might otherwise benefit from the contributions of
these individuals, had they been given the opportunity to become full
members of their new society.
B. Guidelines
As discussed in Part VI, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, The
Netherlands, and Norway have all issued guidelines advising that
163. See Refugee Convention, supra note 21 (discussing the rights awarded to
refugees).
164. See Steinbock, supra note 16, at 810 (discussing how the narrow definition of
subsidiary protection can create ambiguities in practice for certain refugees).
165. See generally Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an
Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J.
2 (2004) (defining temporary protection).
166. See id. at 10 (explaining that the "Refugee Convention was drafted to address the
mass displacements caused by World War II in Europe").
167. Id.
168. For example, Rodi Alvarado's case is pending approval of the proposed
regulations.
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persecution based on gender may qualify an individual for refugee status.
At first blush, these guidelines seem to alleviate the difficulties involved in
otherwise shoe-homing gender into the category of a "particular social
group" as discussed in the three hypothetical situations discussed
previously. However, it must be remembered that these guidelines do not
provide protection, per se, from gender-based persecution and that they still
require an individual to prove the causal nexus between her persecution and
her gender. The often private nature of gender-based persecution renders
such proof especially troublesome, though, rendering such guidelines
ineffective. 169 For example, if such guidelines were implemented in the
United States, would Rodi Alvarado have been granted asylum under such
guidelines? It is hard to know if a judge would rule that Ms. Alvarado was
being persecuted on account of her gender, and award her asylum, or if a
judge would find that she was persecuted because her aggressor-husband
had a personal problem with her, as an individual, and not with all women,
generally.
170
C. Common Law Tests
The "protected" or "innate" characteristic tests adopted in many
common law nations suffer from the same causal nexus difficulty as the
guidelines and are perhaps even less helpful because they leave it to judges,
and the eventual development of precedent, which can always be
overturned, to determine what qualifies as a "protected" or "innate"
characteristic. 17  Though guidelines are not perfect, their clear statement
that gender can be a basis of persecution is preferable to the "protected" or
"innate" characteristic inquiry.
D. Addition of a Sixth Ground
The addition of a sixth ground or the inclusion of statutory definitions
that explicitly define the term "particular social group" to include "gender"
169. See, e.g., Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim's
Particular Social Group, 49 Loy. L. REV. 287, 287 (2003) (discussing common issues that
persecuted female refugees experience in bringing their asylum claims); see also supra Part
III.B.
170. See supra notes 100-108 (discussing case of Rodi Alvarado).
171. See supra Part VI.A (discussing the use of the "protected," "innate," or
"immutable" characteristic tests in common law nations).
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would provide more clarity than the common law "innate characteristic"
test and avoid the logical inconsistencies of the various guidelines. Even
these statutory changes, though, are plagued by the "on account of," "based
on," or "for reasons of" language that leaves women to face the often
insurmountable barrier of proving their persecutor's intent to harm them
based on their gender and not for some other private, more individual
reason.
E. Proposed U.S. Regulations
The proposed American regulations would define a particular social
group as follows:
A particular social group is composed of members who share a
common, immutable characteristic, such as sex, color, kinship ties, or
past experience, that a member either cannot change or that is so
fundamental to the identity or conscience of the member that he or she
should not be required to change it.
172
This definition would have an effect similar to that of the statutory
definitions of "particular social group" discussed above and adopted in
countries such as Ireland, South Africa, Germany, and Spain. Obviously,
these regulations would be an improvement over current American law,
which appears to be woefully behind many other developed nations in this
area, but they would nonetheless suffer from the same deficiencies that
plague the solutions of those other nations: they still require an applicant to
prove the intent of her persecutor.
VIII. Elimination of the Five Grounds
Elimination of the requirement that persecution be "on account of' one
of the five grounds may be the solution to the legal difficulties surrounding
gender-based asylum claims. As discussed above, the political purpose of
asylum is to shame another country by providing a persecuted individual
with membership in the new country. 173 Given the posture of the United
States and other nations on women's rights issues, it would seem that these
countries would wish to shame countries that permit gender-based
172. Asylum & Withholding Regulations, 65 Fed Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R pt. 208).
173. See supra Part III.A (reiterating the purpose of asylum).
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persecution by providing asylum to victims of such persecution. The
problem we have seen, though, is that the current Refugee Definition and
the various attempts to reform it still require a causal nexus between the
persecution and the victim's gender. 174 This nexus is often difficult to
prove, given the overwhelmingly private nature of gender-based
persecution. 175 The solution, therefore, may be the elimination of this
causal nexus requirement.
Victims of gender-based persecution rarely have difficulty proving
they have been persecuted, but often face difficulty proving the intent of
their persecutor(s).1 76 Even in nations that explicitly recognize gender as a
social group or a sixth ground, it is often hard to determine if persecution is
based on, for example, one's status as a woman or on one's status as a
particular person's wife. Many judges struggle with the need to find
persecution that is clearly based on non-personal grounds, as in the case of
Rodi Alvarado. In that case, the correct result was clear to the immigration
judges, Janet Reno, the United States Department of Justice, and the
American people, yet the requirement that persecution be "on account of'
one of the five grounds almost sent Ms. Alvarado back to certain torture
and possible death at the hands of her husband. 77 This section will argue
that elimination of the five grounds and the "on account of' language will
promote the political purpose behind asylum by making it easier for
legitimate asylum applicants, especially victims of gender-based
persecution, to gain asylum. This section will also discuss how the
elimination of this causal nexus will not impede the government's ability to
maintain a sufficiently narrow asylum program.
Once amended, the new statute would read
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution.
174. See supra Parts III.B, V, VI (noting that all refugee definitions still require a
causal nexus).
175. See supra Part III.B (stating reasons why establishing a nexus can be difficult).
176. See, e.g., Irena Lieberman, Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based Violence, and
Asylum Jurisprudence, HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE, available at http://www.abanet.org
/irr/hr/summer02/lieberman.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (discussing proof issues faced
by women seeking asylum from gender-based persecution) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
177. See supra Part V.
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The only change would be the elimination of the causal nexus
requirement, so the asylum framework would still remain quite narrow
while providing greater protection for victims of gender-based persecution
who often experience great difficulty in proving their persecution was "on
account of' one of the grounds. This is because (1) the current five grounds
are outdated creations of the mid-twentieth century, (2) applicants would
still have to prove they could not safely relocate within their own country,
(3) applicants would need to prove their home countries could not protect
them, and (4) the maintenance of current statutory exclusions would ensure
that "undesirables," such as genocidaires, are not allowed to claim asylum
protection. This subsection will discuss each of these issues in greater
detail.
Firstly, the current five grounds are no longer appropriate. As
discussed earlier, these grounds were developed with refugees of World
Wars I and II in mind. The drafters were, therefore, concerned with
protecting the kinds of individuals who had been persecuted during those
wars and were not necessarily concerned with developing criteria that
would be applicable to all people in all places for all times. (It must be
remembered that the Refugee Convention of 1951 contained geographical
and time restrictions that limited protection to individuals in Europe who
were persecuted during a specific time period that corresponded with the
World Wars. When no longer deemed appropriate, those restrictions were
lifted.178) Furthermore, the Refugee Convention grounds were penned in
1951. Notions of acceptable behavior toward women-and a variety of
other groups, such as sexual minorities-are far different now than they
were in 1951. For example, as discussed previously, violent acts in the
"private" sphere, in which many of the world's women spend most of their
lives, are now considered persecution, but in 1951, acts outside of the
"public" sphere would never have been conceived of as persecution.179 As
such, the individuals that countries now wish to protect are not entirely
covered by the existing grounds, and, therefore, these grounds do not
correspond to the evolving needs of today's society.
Secondly, the requirement that an individual NOT be able to find
safety through relocation in her country180 is a powerful limitation on
178. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part III.B (discussing how traditional views of persecution reflected an
inherent pro-male bias).
180. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(i)(B) (requiring denial of asylum where "[t]he applicant
could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of
nationality...").
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potential asylum claims. Unless an individual is being persecuted by a
powerful or wealthy individual or organization, a victim can often find
safety by moving to another part of the country where the persecutor does
not have ties or sufficient resources to find and further victimize the
individual. This provision likely renders many persecuted individuals
ineligible for asylum and ensures that only those who truly cannot regain
full membership in society in their home country are granted asylum.
Thirdly, because an important aspect of the political purpose behind
asylum is its shaming function, 18 1 when an individual's country takes
meaningful 18 2 steps to protect an individual from violence, then there is no
reason to shame that country. In such situations, the individual is a crime
victim and not a victim of persecution that rises to the level necessary to
obtain asylum. For example, victims of domestic violence will not be
allowed to seek asylum abroad if their country actively prosecutes instances
of abuse. In that situation, the domestic violence is a crime, punished by
the home country. Such a situation is clearly distinguishable from that in
which a government acquiesces in the domestic abuse by refusing to protect
the victim. It is in this latter situation that actions in the private sphere take
on a public quality and rise to the level of persecution necessary for a grant
of asylum.
Fourthly, the current exclusions should be maintained, for example, so
as not to protect a person fleeing "political persecution" based on his strong
belief in Nazism. Our country does not espouse hateful politics, and,
therefore, the political purpose of asylum is not served by protecting people
that the United States finds morally repugnant. Some careful thought
should be given to the breadth of such exclusions, however, as a blanket
exclusion on "criminals" may exclude a person that would not be
considered a criminal in the United States or someone who has committed a
minor infraction, recognized in the United States, but who faces a
disproportionate or cruel and inhuman punishment in his home country.
Such harsh penalties may constitute the sort of behavior the United States
wishes to condemn through the provision of asylum protection to such an
individual. Therefore, much thought and discussion should be given to the
issue before additional exclusions are created. The point remains, though,
that it is possible for Congress to pass legislation that specifically excludes
181. See supra Part III.A (describing the conferral of asylum status as necessarily
condemning the nation of origin of the asylee).
182. It is important to distinguish between meaningful efforts to protect victims and
superficial attempts to do so.
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"extra," undesirable asylees who might otherwise slip through the
definition, should such a situation arise.
For these reasons, eliminating the requirement that persecution be "on
account of' one of the specified grounds for asylum might provide more
protection and consistency to victims of gender-based persecution claiming
asylum in the United States. There are, however, at least two potential
downsides that should be considered: (1) the possibility of a massive
increase in asylum applicants that could cripple the immigration system and
(2) the possibility that opening up the refugee statute to revision may result
in unexpected changes that could place victims of gender-based persecution
at a disadvantage.
Firstly, one must consider the ever-present fear that such an
amendment would open the "floodgates" to millions and millions of
asylees. Such fears, after all, were the reason why the drafters of the
Refugee Convention rejected broader definitions that did not require a
causal nexus in favor of clearly enumerated categories. 183 Such fears are
perhaps no longer legitimate, as nations have had decades to become
accustomed to the asylum adjudication process and to develop other
limitations on asylum applications, such as those mentioned in the
paragraphs above. Furthermore, it should be remembered that even without
those additional limitations, most people do not have the resources to travel
to the United States and even apply for asylum in the first place, and no
expansion of the refugee definition can change that economic reality.
Therefore, though further study on this subject is needed, it is quite possible
that an expansion of the refugee definition would not result in a huge
increase of asylum applications.
Secondly, human rights advocates have voiced concern that opening
up the refugee statute to debate might result in a severe narrowing of the
definition that was not envisioned by those proposing that the statute be
changed.' 84 This concern may have some merit in this case, and such fears
are always present whenever legislative change is sought. It will simply
need to be determined whether the current injustice being done to gender-
based persecution victims seeking asylum is great enough to justify the risk.
183. See supra Part II (describing the U.S. representative to the Refugee Convention
Drafting Committee's emphasis on producing a clear, narrow definition of refugee).
184. Cf Oxford, supra note 52, at 21 (describing the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform
and Responsibility Act, which broadened access to asylum for those subject to coercive
population controls as otherwise "generally restrictive legislation").
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IX Conclusion
Asylum is a time-honored concept that has evolved from a practice of
offering general refuge to a very specific legal status that offers protection
to specific people in specific situations. In the current era, in which asylum
is an official form of state aid to foreigners, there has been some
disagreement as to the purpose of asylum, whether it is humanitarian or
political in nature. This Note finds the political conception of asylum most
logically appealing and agrees that asylum's purpose is to provide both
protection and societal membership to victims of persecution in order to
condemn state or state-condoned human rights violations. Gender-based
persecution clearly falls under this "political purpose" rubric as it robs
victims of both safety and societal membership and involves acts that are
clearly odious to American society and law. As gender-based persecution
fulfills the political purpose of asylum, it should, therefore, be recognized
within the legal framework governing asylum in the United States.
Unfortunately, the current American framework, based on the Refugee
Convention penned by the United Nations in 1951, contains an inherently
male bias and does not reflect the full range of human rights violations the
United States should be able to condemn through the use of asylum,
including gender-based persecution.
The international community, as well as the United States and various
other developed nations, has taken steps to integrate gender-based asylum
claims into the current framework. These steps have included the issuance
of guidelines meant to help adjudicators fit a gender-based persecution
claim into one of the five asylum grounds, the amendment of statutes to
define "particular social group" as including sex, and the addition of gender
as a sixth basis for asylum. Unfortunately, none of these solutions has been
entirely satisfactory, as even the best ones still require victims of gender-
based persecution to prove the intent of their attacker(s). Because of the
often personal nature of gender-based persecution claims, such intent can
be difficult to prove, and, consequently, many valid asylum claims are
denied.
The solution to this problem may be to eliminate the requirement that
persecution be "on account of' particular grounds. It may be enough to
simply require proof of persecution alone. At least in the United States, the
standard for "persecution" is quite high and, coupled with all the other
current restrictions and limitations on asylum claims, the elimination of the
five grounds may provide relief to victims of gender-based persecution,
while preventing an over-expansion of the refugee definition. This solution
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is not without its difficulties, such as a possible fear of opening up
"floodgates" of applications, but it may prove to be a more workable
solution than the current American scheme or any of the other legal
frameworks that have been implemented in other countries. Therefore,
given the necessity of rethinking our current asylum system, the possibility
of eliminating the five grounds of asylum is an idea that should be strongly
considered.
